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Abstract To date, scholars have rarely talked about contemporary antisemitism and Islam-
ophobia in France as part of a single story. When they have, it has typically been as part of
a framework for analyzing racism that is essentially competitive: some depict Islamophobia
as less a real problem than a frequent excuse to ignore antisemitism; others minimize anti-
semitism as an unfortunate but marginal phenomenon by comparison with the pervasive nature
of anti-Muslim racism in French society. This article argues that the two are inseparable, and
it focuses on a hitherto overlooked set of connections: in the era since the attacks on Charlie
Hebdo and Hyper Cacher in January 2015, at key flash points that question Muslim belonging
in France, the position of Jews has repeatedly been invoked in ambiguous, contradictory ways.
Participants in these public debates have sometimes forcefully maintained that Jews are unlike
Muslims, since they have long been fully integrated French citizens. At other moments, these
discussions have raised the specter of Jewish ethnic and religious difference. By emphasizing
Jewish particularity, such debates evoke, perforce, the past twenty-five years of controversies
about the allegedly problematic attire, food, and beliefs of France’s Muslims. The article fo-
cuses on several key moments, from the speech of Prime Minister Manuel Valls before the
French parliament in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher attacks, to the kippah
and burkini affairs of 2016, to the provocative comments of candidates in the 2017 presidential
elections concerning Muslim and Jewish religious and ethnic markers of difference.
Keywords Kippah · Burkini · Hijab · France · Charlie Hebdo · Jews and Muslims
For all the ink that has been spilled on the matters of antisemitism and Is-
lamophobia in contemporary France, commentators rarely treat the two in
tandem. To the extent that some observers connect antisemitism and Islamo-
phobia, they tend to do so along one of two sharply contrasting paths. Some
depict Muslims as France’s—and Europe’s—“new Jews,” that is, as having
assumed Jews’ former structural position within European racism.1 In this
view, today’s Islamophobia is the successor to the antisemitism of prior eras.
1For France, arguments in this vein can already be seen in Esther Benbassa, La république
face à ses minorités: Les juifs hier, les musulmans aujourd’hui (Paris, 2004); Joan Scott, The
Politics of the Veil (Princeton, NJ, 2010). For Europe broadly, see esp. Matti Bunzl, ed., Anti-
Semitism and Islamophobia: Hatreds Old and New in Europe (Chicago, 2007); Enzo Traverso,
The End of Jewish Modernity (London, 2015).
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A contrasting approach emphasizes the rise in anti-Jewish violence in twenty-
first-century France and the fact that most known perpetrators are Muslims.2
Those with the latter perspective often contend that the specter of Islamo-
phobia plays a debilitating role, leading to a kind of political correctness that
prevents the state from speaking truthfully about the threat of antisemitism
and responding to it appropriately.3
In reality, French Jewry’s position today is neither so secure as suggested
in the first outlook, nor so singularly imperiled as the second implies. Rather,
events since the Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher attacks have repeatedly
cast into sharp relief the ambivalent place of Jews in contemporary France—
and how ideas about Muslim and Jewish difference are intertwined. National
conversations focused on Muslim difference have had a rather paradoxical
impact on Jews. At first blush, when Jews are invoked in conversations about
Muslims, it is more often as a model than as a problem. Rhetoric around
Muslims has typically treated their current status in France in terms akin to
the discourse of “regeneration” around Jews in the era of emancipation: that
is, Muslims can gain full acceptance in France if they will enter the mod-
ern, secular world and fully accept what it means to live as a French citizen
under French sovereign law. By contrast, few dispute that Jews largely have
succeeded in fulfilling the terms of the French social contract and integrating
within the larger French body politic.
Nonetheless, these conversations have a more ambiguous side for Jews as
well. First, the presence of Jews in conversations about Muslims—France’s
current, undisputed ethnic and religious Other—constantly reiterates that
Jews remain different too. In the process, even the most ardent defenders of
Jews’ place in the Republic reveal that the ideal of French universalism para-
doxically requires that Jews be both demonstrably different and integrated.
Second, both policy changes and rhetorical turns have sometimes highlighted
Jewish difference as itself a competing or analogous problem alongside that
of Muslims. Typically, Jews’ inclusion is thrown into question based upon
their alleged resort to communautarisme (their communal affiliation, which
is theoretically denied by the social contract of French citizenship), or their
presumed loyalty to the State of Israel, or their persistent practice of out-
moded, embodied religious rituals.
Thus it will not do simply to treat Muslims in France as the “new Jews”
or to address antisemitism in isolation. Both approaches risk ignoring three
2On antisemitic incidents and the known perpetrators, the most thorough information is found
in the annual reports of the Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme.
3For a concise, representative articulation of this view by one of its leading adherents, see
Shmuel Trigano, “A Journey through French Anti-Semitism,” Jewish Review of Books 6, no. 1
(Spring 2015): 5–7, https://jewishreviewofbooks.com/articles/1534/a-journey-through-french
-anti-semitism/.
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essential realities: ongoing and persistent attacks against Jews and Jewish
institutions, frequently perpetrated by Muslims; the enduring discussion of
Jewish communal identity as a problem of difference, even as Jews are simul-
taneously upheld as a model for integration; and the way public conversations
repeatedly treat Muslim and Jewish difference as interlocked.4
A Tale of Two Speeches
On January 13, 2015, days after the attacks on Charlie Hebdo and Hyper
Cacher, Prime Minister Manuel Valls addressed the French parliament. In a
widely praised speech, Valls devoted considerable time to the positions of
France’s Jews and Muslims. In the first instance, he detailed the wave of
antisemitism of recent years, calling it “intolerable” and insisting that Jews
had to be made safer in France. Further, he argued, “we know from history”
that antisemitism is “a symptom of the crisis of democracy, of a crisis of
the Republic.” Insisting that an attack on Jews was an attack on both France
itself and the “universal conscience,” Valls reiterated a sentiment that he had
expressed previously: “without the Jews of France, France would no longer
be France.”5
With regard to Muslims, the prime minister painted a picture that was at
once parallel and more complex. While he denounced Islamic radicalism and
said that France needed to show unyielding strength in the face of attacks
carried out in the name of Islam, he insisted that France was not at war with
Islam itself. Indeed, he asserted the fundamental importance of protecting
Muslim fellow citizens and houses of worship, and he spoke poignantly not
only of anti-Muslim attacks in recent days but also of the fear and shame
expressed to him by Muslim friends. “Islam,” he noted, “is now the second
religion of France and has its rightful place in France.”6 He claimed that
France needed to demonstrate this fact not only to its own people but also to
the world.
Underneath Valls’s words about France’s Jews and Muslims, one could
detect a call for tolerance of all religions in the public space, even intima-
tions of a “right to difference” like that championed most famously by the
4For an incisive, extended critique of the idea that Europe’s Muslims are its “new Jews,” see
Chad Goldberg, conclusion of Modernity and the Jews in European Social Thought (Chicago,
2017).
5
“Allocution de Manuel Valls, premier ministre: Séance spéciale d’hommage aux victims des
attentats,” Assemblée nationale, January 13, 2015, Service Communication, Hôtel Matignon,
7–8. For a video recording of Valls’s speech, see “Attentats en France: Retrouvez en inte-
gralite le discours de Manuel Valls,” France 24, January 13, 2015, https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=mcX1iQ9TLPI.
6
“Allocution de Manuel Valls,” 9.
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antiracism movement of the 1980s. Both Jews and Muslims, Valls seemed
to imply, while having distinctive positions and histories in France, faced
peculiar challenges and were worthy of protection and respect. The inter-
twining of Jewish and Muslim destinies—with one another and with that of
the Republic—became most explicit when Valls declared passionately near
the end of his speech: “I don’t want it to be the case any longer that there are
Jews in our country who are afraid or Muslims who are ashamed! Because
the Republic is fraternal, it is generous, it is there to welcome everyone!”7
Here Valls had implicitly invoked a vision of France wherein integration
and, by extension, laïcité (secularism) could follow the path of accommo-
dation that has historically constituted the more pragmatic strand of French
republican secularism.8 And yet within the same speech there soon emerged
a discourse of disparity: in the end, being Jewish and Muslim in public did
not mean the same thing. In the case of Jews, speaking of one of the vic-
tims of the attack at Hyper Cacher, he called it unacceptable that a man who
had been sent by his father from Tunisia to France so that he could be safe
as a Jew would be murdered while he was out “buying bread for Shabbat.”
More than once, Valls bitterly denounced the fact that Jews were targeted
simply for being Jews. In the case of Muslims, by contrast, he couched their
acceptance in more conditional terms: “The Republic, laïcité, the equality of
women, are compatible with all religions on our national soil that accept the
principles and the values of the Republic.”9 The line suggested that whereas
a Jew should be able to be a Jew in public, this was less certain for a Muslim.
Suddenly, it seemed, Valls was invoking the language of the more militant,
uncompromising strand of laïcité that has sought to claim normativity since
the early twenty-first century.10 Valls declared that France had been attacked
precisely because of measures like its controversial 2004 law banning all
7
“Allocution de Manuel Valls,” 9.
8Such a pragmatic version of the Republic and laïcité has deep roots in France: it is em-
bodied in the words of Emile Combes—one of the most anticlerical prime ministers of the
Third Republic—who called the Qur’an an exemplary work of literature and insisted that
secular schoolteachers show the book “the most profound respect.” More recently, since the
early twenty-first century, the French state has institutionalized a new effort to recognize and
combat various forms of discrimination, including against ethnic minorities. Jean Bauberot,
L’Intégrisme républicain contre la laïcité (Paris, 2006), chaps. 3, 5. On the two strands of the
Republic, see Veronique Dimier, “French Secularism in Debate: Old Wine in New Bottles,”
French Politics, Culture & Society 26, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 92–110. Regarding an important
“countertradition” within French universalism that has not always insisted on flattening all
(particularly Jewish) difference, see Maurice Samuels, The Right to Difference: French Uni-
versalism and the Jews (Chicago, 2016).
9
“Allocution de Manuel Valls,” 9 (my emphasis).
10Dimier refers to this version as “assimilationist and centralizing.” See Dimier, “French Sec-
ularism in Debate,” 94.
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“ostentatious” religious signs in public schools (in response specifically to
the hijab) and its 2010 ban on the so-called burka in public spaces. At the
heart of Valls’s speech, then, lay a deep tension between two distinct models
of laïcité, and by extension, of the Republic.11
Within this equivocation on the terms of laïcité lay another, equally im-
portant for our purposes. On the one hand, Valls’s statements about Jews’
importance to France’s essence and his more cautious approach to Muslim
inclusion suggested that unlike Muslims, Jews had a special place in the fab-
ric of the Republic qua Jews. On the other hand, at arguably the climactic
moment of the speech, Valls made explicit an analogy between the position,
vulnerability, and difference of Jews and of Muslims. Jewish difference was,
that is, at once a possible model and a potential problem.
I have lingered over Valls’s much-acclaimed speech because for the next
two years, its contradictory impulses would prove emblematic across sev-
eral moments of crisis and controversy. Thus opened a critical new phase in
an old story. Repeatedly, since the nineteenth century, the images and fates
of Jews and Muslims in France and its empire have been deeply entwined.
More specifically, French discourses about Muslim difference have served
both to highlight and to downplay Jewish difference. This was the case, for
instance, in debates over Jewish emancipation in Algeria during the middle
decades of the nineteenth century and in the months surrounding Algerian
independence in 1961–62, when Jews from Algeria secured guarantees of
French citizenship in direct contradistinction to Algeria’s Muslims, who had
to forfeit theirs.12
The events of 2015–16 introduced a new conversation specifically about
laïcité, in which Jews have at once served as the foil and the shadow for
fears about Muslims. When Valls said France would not be France without
its Jews, he highlighted the necessity of both Jewish difference and Jewish
integration to the French Republic’s self-conception. At the same time, his
statement about the compatibility of the Republic with all religions that ac-
cept its principles echoed the calls of revolutionaries and nineteenth-century
reformists for the “regeneration” of Jews in exchange for citizenship and full
11Maurice Samuels has also offered a careful analysis of these contradictions within Valls’s
speech, though with somewhat different emphases and conclusions. Samuels, Right to Differ-
ence, conclusion.
12For entwined discourses and policies regarding Jews and Muslims in the nineteenth cen-
tury, see Joshua Schreier, Arabs of the Jewish Faith: The Civilizing Mission in Algeria (New
Brunswick, NJ, 2010). For the twentieth century, see Maud S. Mandel, Muslims and Jews in
France: History of a Conflict (Princeton, NJ, 2014); Ethan B. Katz, The Burdens of Brother-
hood: Jews and Muslims from North Africa to France (Cambridge, MA, 2015). On the moment
of 1961–62 specifically, see also Todd Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian
War and the Remaking of France (Ithaca, NY, 2006), chap. 6.
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equality.13 The unspoken opposition here between Muslim aspiration and
Jewish achievement was that Jews, having regenerated themselves as com-
pletely French, were now acceptable, but only in that fully regenerated con-
dition. Since Valls’s speech, Jews’ ambivalent position has been highlighted
over and over in conversations ostensibly about Muslims. Various French
state officials and intellectuals have repeatedly invoked, even criticized, Jew-
ish difference in connection with or analogy to that of Muslims; others, mean-
while, have defended a Jewish right to public difference or highlighted Jewish
assimilation.
Whose Laïcité?
In the months following the attacks at Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher,
the divergence between Jews’ and Muslims’ positions in the French public
sphere appeared to become more clear cut: Jewish difference was subsumed
into an overall sense of inclusion while Muslims once again appeared sus-
pect. Thousands of French police and soldiers were deployed to guard Jew-
ish sites.14 Meanwhile, even as they spoke of aggressive efforts to integrate
Muslims, French leaders appeared to double down on more militant versions
of laïcité. For many, the free expression championed by Charlie Hebdo, and
more specifically the need to defend the newspaper’s right to ridicule Islam,
became emblematic of laïcité (no matter the lack of historicity in such an
understanding).15 Within two weeks of the attacks, the French education
ministry announced a plan to invest 250 million euros in “moral and civic
education,” emphasizing both a renewed focus on laïcité and the need for
French teachers to stamp out any attempt by students to question the values
13See Alyssa Goldstein Sepinwall, The Abbé Grégoire and the French Revolution: The Mak-
ing of Modern Universalism (Berkeley, 2005); Jay Berkovitz, The Shaping of Jewish Identity
in Nineteenth-Century France (Detroit, 1989).
14
“Les 717 écoles et lieux de culte juifs français protégés par 4700 policiers et gen-
darmes,” Le Point, January 12, 2015, http://www.lepoint.fr/societe/les-717-ecoles-juives-en
-france-protegees-par-4-700-policiers-et-gendarmes-12-01-2015-1895724_23.php; “Deux
après l’Hyper Cacher, des commerces juifs entre vigilance et ‘vivre avec,”’ BFMTV (web-
site), January 4, 2017, https://www.bfmtv.com/police-justice/deux-apres-l-hyper-cacher-des
-commerces-juifs-entre-vigilance-et-vivre-avec-1077755.html.
15James D. Le Sueur, “Conflating Laïcité with Free Speech: The French are Mak-
ing a Mistake about Charlie Hebdo,” Muslimmatters.org, February 19, 2015, https
://muslimmatters.org/2015/02/19/conflating-laicite-with-free-speech-the-french-are-making-a
-mistake-about-charlie-hebdo/.
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of the Republic.16 French president François Hollande designated December
9 as a national day of laïcité to be celebrated in all public schools.17
For Jews, the issue of laïcité in schools has long been highly complex.
Many Jews vocally supported the 2004 ban on “ostentatious religious signs”
in French public schools, seeing it as a bulwark against the rise of Islamism.
At the same time, because the law banned not only the hijab but also the
kippah, it accelerated the mass departure of traditional Jewish students from
the French public schools where they had enrolled in large numbers until
only a generation before.18
Before the dust had settled from the attacks of January 2015, it was the
school cafeteria that had become a new site for debates over laïcité. Once
more, in a discussion focused on Muslims, Jews too were implicated.19 Na-
tional controversy erupted over efforts to overturn the widespread practice
of the so-called substitution menu. Such an option has long been available in
thousands of French public schools as an alternative on days when the cafete-
ria’s main menu contains pork. In March 2015, however, Gilles Platret, mayor
of Chalon-sur-Saône in Eastern France, announced that effective September
2015, his town would institute a single menu for all students. Platret cited
“the principle of laïcité, which is the foundation of our coexistence.”20 Sev-
eral other municipalities considered following suit. Also invoking laïcité,
France’s former president (and then presidential aspirant) Nicholas Sarkozy
reiterated his own call for an end to the substitution menu. To be sure, such
16
“Laïcité et valeurs républicaines à l’école: Le plan de Vallaud-Belkacem,” France 24
(website), January 22, 2015, http://www.france24.com/fr/20150122-france-laicite-valeurs
-republicaines-ecole-solutions-vallaud-belkacem-attentat-charlie-hebdo.
17Aurélie Collas, “Après les attentats, l’école exalte la laïcité,” Le Monde, December 9, 2015,
https://www.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/article/2015/12/09/une-journee-de-la-laicite-a-l
-ecole-dix-mois-apres-les-polemiques-de-janvier_4827470_4809495.html.
18Regarding Jewish responses to the “Headscarf Affair” of 2003–4 and its antecedents, see
Judith E. Vichniac, “Jewish Identity Politics and the Scarf Affairs in France,” French Politics,
Culture & Society 26, no. 1 (2008): 111–28. On the law’s effect as a secularizing measure
that pushed Jewish students out of French public schools, see Gayle Zachmann, “The Happy
Jew: Legacies, Crises, and Post–Charlie Hebdo Conscience,” Contemporary French Civiliza-
tion 41, no. 2 (2016): 282. Statistically, the shift has been marked over a longer term: from
sixteen thousand students in Jewish schools in the late 1980s, the number had almost dou-
bled to twenty-eight thousand by 2002 and it has continued to grow. Jonathan Laurence and
Justin Vaisse, Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France
(Washington, DC, 2006), 228.
19During the 2012 presidential elections, for instance, issues like the substitution menu (see
below) and the question of halal in school cafeterias had already been topics of debate.
20
“Chalon-sur-Saône: Le maire décide de revenir au menu unique dans les cantines scolaires,”
Franceinfo (website), March 16, 2015, https://france3-regions.francetvinfo.fr/bourgogne
-franche-comte/saone-et-loire/chalon-sur-saone/chalon-sur-saone-le-maire-decide-de-revenir
-au-menu-unique-dans-les-cantines-scolaires-676197.html.
E. B. KATZ
voices were far from unanimous. Prime Minister Valls sharply opposed such
measures, as did some members of Sarkozy’s own party.21
Nonetheless, the contest over the substitution menu saw state actors seek
to curtail the observance of Jewish and Muslim traditions in the name of sec-
ularism and neutrality. While the move clearly targeted Muslims, it poten-
tially affected a number of Jewish students as well.22 Moreover, it renewed
a long-standing emphasis on the importance of certain kinds of food and
drink to the French national character, which has led frequently to questions
about Jews’ depth of Frenchness. As Pierre Birnbaum has documented, pork
in particular has long been widely recognized as “an emblem that unifies
ways of doing, of feeling, and of celebrating among all citizens.”23 This was
hardly the first time that expositors of the republican tradition had struggled
to take seriously the religious laws and traditions of certain groups concern-
ing forbidden foods. The controversy echoed many secularists’ long-standing
insistence that religious legal codes and bodily rituals are fundamentally at
odds with enlightened modernity. According to this supercessionist outlook,
becoming a secular and loyal citizen necessarily entails the abandonment of
such laws and rituals.24
This view resonates further in contemporary France, not only for Mus-
lims but also for Jews, due to widely circulating writings valorizing St. Paul,
the Jew who became the “Apostle to the Gentiles,” as a model for contem-
porary universalism. Prominent French intellectual Alain Badiou has written
extensively about the “authentic Jew,” of which Paul is the archetype.25 This
21Alexandre Boudet, “Sarkozy et les menus sans porc: Sa position ne convainc pas tout
le monde a l’UMP,” Huffpost (website), March 18, 2015, https://www.huffingtonpost.fr
/2015/03/18/sarkozy-menus-sans-porc-position-convainc-pas-tout-le-monde-ump-laicite_n
_6894494.html; “Menu sans porc à la cantine: La polémique revient sur la table,” Sud
Ouest, March 18, 2015, http://www.sudouest.fr/2015/03/18/menu-sans-porc-a-la-cantine-la
-polemique-revient-sur-la-table-1863152-710.php.
22Admittedly, this would likely be less of an issue for Jews, since far fewer religiously obser-
vant Jews than Muslims have continued in recent years to attend French public schools.
23Pierre Birnbaum, La République et le cochon (Paris, 2013), 25; Birnbaum, Anti-Semitism
in France: A Political History from Léon Blum to the Present, trans. Miriam Kochan (Oxford,
1992), chap. 6.
24This strand of secularism has been dissected in the work of Talal Asad. See esp. Asad, For-
mations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, and Modernity (Palo Alto, CA, 2003). On Muslims
in France specifically, the issue of corporeal practices is treated at length in Naomi Davidson,
Only Muslim: Embodying Islam in Twentieth-Century France (Ithaca, NY, 2012). Ironically,
as Birnbaum clearly shows in La Republique et le cochon, ideas in France about both the
cultural importance of pork and the need to discard outmoded dietary laws owe as much to
legacies of the ancien régime and French Catholicism as they do to the French Revolution and
republican laïcité.
25The specific language here comes from Alain Badiou, Polemics, trans. Steve Corcoran (Lon-
don, 2006), 184–85. Here and in my discussions of Badiou below I have relied upon the cita-
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Jew is defined as “the one who says in the name of all others that there is no
law separating them” and channels himself “to break the divisive law and de-
vote humanity to the universal.”26 Badiou contrasts this so-called authenticity
with what he terms the “virtual” Jews and their “S.I.T.” complex, standing for
“Shoah,” “Israel,” and “Tradition.”27 Thus, for Badiou, the ideal Jew is one
who abandons any laws, rituals, or attachments that have separated him or
her from the universal. What Badiou’s outlook shares with that of the op-
ponents of the substitute meal in public school cafeterias is the idea that if
Jews want to be embraced by France, they should shed any vestiges of their
particularistic religious practices or cultural identity.
In the face of the controversy over the substitute meals, France’s chief
rabbi Haïm Korsia spoke up in the name of a different vision of public sec-
ularism. He denounced Mayor Platret’s action as “heresy” and sought to re-
claim the accommodationist strand of laïcité, which he defined as “living
together while preserving the freedom of each individual in respect for the
other and the law.”28
Citizens versus Terrorists, or Why Kippahs Are Not Like Burkinis
If debates over pork in school cafeterias highlighted common predicaments
of Jews and Muslims, the events of November 13, 2015, separated the two
groups once more. That night, in a series of coordinated attacks, Islamist ter-
rorists murdered 130 people in Paris and its northern suburb of Saint-Denis.
In the wake of these attacks, French Jews spoke of a stronger identification
between themselves and the wider French public. One commentator, Olivier
Rafowicz, himself a reserve colonel in the Israeli Defense Forces, wrote in
the pages of the community newsletter Actualité Juive: “Today the Euro-
peans understand that Israel is a kind of [Noah’s] Ark, and that [in Europe]
they must in the same manner construct their own [bulwark against] the del-
uge of hatred and violence that awaits them.”29 Some even noted that the site
tions and analysis of Badiou in Sarah Hammerschlag, The Figural Jew: Politics and Identity
in Postwar French Thought (Chicago, 2010), 261–62.
26Alain Badiou, Circonstances, vol. 3, Portées du mot “juif ” (Paris, 2005); Badiou, Polemics,
49–50.
27Badiou, Polemics, esp. 230.
28
“Suppression des repas de substitution sans porc: Une “hérésie” pour le Grand rab-
bin de France,” Le Monde Juif, March 24, 2015, https://www.lemondejuif.info/2015/03
/suppression-des-repas-de-substitution-sans-porc-une-heresie-pour-le-grand-rabbin-de-france/.
29Olivier Rafowicz, “Olivier Rafowicz: La France a été frappée au coeur.” Actual-
ité Juive, December 1, 2015, http://www.actuj.com/2015-12/france/2672-olivier-rafowicz-la
-france-a-ete-frappee-au-coeur.
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of the most lethal of the November 13 attacks, the Bataclan nightclub, not
only embodied hedonistic Parisian secular culture; in addition, several years
earlier it had hosted gala events in support of Israel and thus was regarded
by pro-Palestinian activists as a “Zionist space.”30 Such comments strongly
linked the challenges faced by France and Israel. Jewishness and Frenchness
seemed almost one and the same in their vulnerability to terror.
Yet the so-called kippah affair of January 2016 would show just how ten-
uous such solidarity could be, and how transnational identifications on the
part of many French Jews were as often as not seen as a complicating factor
for Jewish adherence to laïcité. On January 11, 2016, in Marseille, a Jew-
ish teacher named Benjamin Amsellem, wearing his kippah and carrying a
tractate of the Talmud, was attacked with a machete. The perpetrator was
a self-radicalized fifteen-year-old Muslim who identified himself as a mem-
ber of ISIS. While Amsellem survived, following the attacks—the latest in a
series of stabbings against Jews—the head of the Jewish community of Mar-
seille advised that all Jews in France should refrain for the time being from
wearing the kippah in public.
Immediately, this statement provoked an uproar. Chief rabbi Korsia urged
Jews to reject this advice. President Hollande sounded a rather more flexible
note than he had just months earlier with respect to expressions of religious
(i.e. Muslim) affiliation in schools; now he contended it was “intolerable
that Jews should feel pressured to hide themselves because of their religious
choices.”31 In response to a call to solidarity from Korsia, many fans of the
Marseilles soccer team wore head coverings to the team’s next match, declar-
ing that such a gesture was necessary “in order no longer to fear being what
you are.”32 Two members of the French National Assembly, one Jewish and
the other Catholic, arrived at the halls of parliament sporting kippahs. The
Catholic deputy Claude Goasguen articulated a decidedly mixed view of how
the kippah compared to Muslim religious attire. Claiming that his gesture was
universal, he insisted that “if tomorrow it is a Muslim [who is under attack
for religious expression], I will wear a crescent”; yet in emphasizing that
30Véronique Mortaigne and Nathalie Guibert, “Le Bataclan, un haut lieu de la culture ciblé
de longue date par les islamistes,” Le Monde, November 15, 2015, https://www.lemonde.fr
/attaques-a-paris/article/2015/11/15/le-bataclan-un-haut-lieu-de-la-culture-cible-de-longue
-date-par-les-islamistes_4810424_4809495.html.
31
“Kippa: Hollande juge ‘insupportable’ que des citoyens français doivent ‘se cacher,”’
Europe 1 (website), January 13, 2016, http://www.europe1.fr/politique/kippa-hollande-juge
-insupportable-que-des-citoyens-francais-doivent-se-cacher-2649921.
32
“Videos: Appel à porter la kippa; Les supporteurs de l’OM solidaires,” Le
Parisien, January 14, 2016, http://www.leparisien.fr/societe/appel-a-porter-la-kippa-les
-supporters-de-l-om-solidaires-14-01-2016-5450795.php.
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the kippah was an example of quiet, unostentatious religious garb, he drew a
specific contrast: “the kippah is not the burka.”33
As the kippah affair became a topic of national conversation, such com-
parisons to Islamic sartorial controversies became common. The influential
Jewish philosopher and public intellectual Shmuel Trigano interpreted ges-
tures like Goasguen’s as empty, criticizing the government for encouraging
Jews to continue to wear their kippahs. Trigano claimed that such calls only
sought to retain an air of normalcy in a time of actual crisis, making Jews
once more “symbolic hostages of the incapacity of the state to face up to the
problem that Islam poses to the Republic.” “If Jews see themselves urged
today to wear the kippah,” he asked, “will [French state officials] demand
tomorrow that Muslims wear the burka as a sign of identity? And then, will
they accuse the Jews of being responsible?”34 For Trigano, Jews were always
being treated as symbols for a republican logic that had retreated from a nec-
essary confrontation with the challenge of Islam to the French laic model.
The head of Marseille’s Jewish community, in urging Jews to stop wearing
the kippah, had simply made a pragmatic, logical suggestion. The absence
of the kippah from the street would make evident, said Trigano, a reality
that already existed: the “erasure of the Jewish community.”35 Whatever one
thinks of his pessimism and sweeping historical claims, Trigano had put his
finger on two uncomfortable realities: first, in January 2016, talking about
the kippah was often a way of talking about (or avoiding addressing di-
rectly) the hijab; and second, Jews increasingly suffered collateral damage
from France’s persistent failure to integrate its Muslim population.36
33Laure Equy,“Des kippas sur la tête à l’Assemblée ‘par solidarité,”’ Libération, January
13, 2016, http://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/01/13/des-kippas-sur-la-tete-a-l-assemblee-par
-solidarite_1426179.
34Shmuel Trigano, “De quoi la kippah est-elle le nom?,” Actualité juive, January 15, 2016,
http://www.actuj.com/2016-01/france/2887-shmuel-trigano-de-quoi-la-kippa-est-elle-le-nom.
35Trigano, “De quoi la kippah est-elle le nom?” One week later, in a similar vein, Trigano
wrote an additional commentary that, while not mentioning the hijab, insisted that the contro-
versy over the kippah was a massive distraction from the real problem: violent militant Islam.
Shmuel Trigano, “Quand le débat sur le kippa cache le vrai débat sur la violence au nom
de l’islam,” Actualité juive, January 21, 2016, http://www.actuj.com/2016-01/france/2901
-shmuel-trigano-quand-le-debat-sur-le-kippa-cache-le-vrai-debat-sur-la-violence-au-nom-de-l
-islam.
36For further development of Trigano’s ideas in this vein, see Trigano, “Journey through
French Anti-Semitism”; and for the misgivings I share with Maud Mandel, see Ethan B. Katz
and Maud S. Mandel, “Strange Journey: A Response to Shmuel Trigano,” Jewish Review of
Books 6, no. 2 (Summer 2015): 47–48. For Trigano’s response, see Shmuel Trigano,“The View
from Paris: A Rejoinder to Ethan Katz and Maud Mandel,” Jewish Review of Books 6, no. 2
(Summer 2015): 49–50.
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Indeed, a number of commentators denounced the kippah as “a provoca-
tion.”37 Two of the most prominent were French intellectuals Rony Brauman
and Eric Zemmour (both secular Jews themselves), each of whom elicited
controversy when he criticized the public wearing of the kippah in a radio in-
terview. Both Brauman and Zemmour framed their critiques in part through
the kippah-hijab connection. Zemmour, a controversial, conservative author
and polemicist, claimed that for Jews, wearing a kippah in republican France
was like donning the notorious yellow star by choice. Until fairly recently,
he insisted, Jews had been a model of integration because they had under-
stood that laïcité entailed the “total separation of sacred from profane, of
private from public.” Zemmour asked pointedly why one should defend the
public wearing of the kippah but not of the Islamic veil. Denouncing the for-
mer as “a religious selfie,” he claimed that it helped to bring about what he
called “the fortuitous encounter between the kippah and the machete.”38 In
this manner, Zemmour suggested that the public wearing of a kippah was a
provocation, much to blame for the attempted murder of a Jew.
For his part, Brauman, former president of the humanitarian organization
Médécins sans frontières (Doctors without borders), attacked the kippah from
two vantage points. First, he claimed that by donning a kippah, “one affirms
a political affiliation, a sign of fidelity to the State of Israel and what is more
problematic, a sign of allegiance to the policy of the State of Israel.” Brauman
thus made a striking and troubling conflation: a traditional article of pious
religious attire became, in his somewhat bizarre rendering, an endorsement
of the controversial policies of a foreign state. Furthermore, he argued that
defending the kippah was highly inconsistent on the part of French officials.
“The Republic,” he claimed, “in its laic vision, which pushes religious signs
outside of the public sphere, exhibits such a sign this time. When a woman
with [an Islamic] veil is attacked, it is a matter of [the need] to put away
religious signs; it is different when it is a man with a kippah who is attacked.
There is a double standard.”39 Brauman thus indicated that Jews wearing the
37On widespread accusations of this sort, see Zachmann, “Happy Jew,” 284 n. 9. As she notes,
during the debate over the kippah affair, Le Monde even felt compelled to run a story defending
the kippah; see Julia Pascual, “A Créteil: ‘Le kippa n’est ni ostentatoire, ni une provo-
cation,”’ January 14, 2016, https://www.lemonde.fr/religions/article/2016/01/14/a-creteil-la
-kippa-n-est-ni-ostentatoire-ni-une-provocation_4846946_1653130.html.
38For an audio recording of Zemmour’s entire statement, see “‘La kippa est une sorte de selfie
religieux,’ déplore Éric Zemmour,” RTL (website), January 14, 2016, http://www.rtl.fr/actu
/debats-societe/la-kippa-est-une-sorte-de-selfie-religieux-deplore-eric-zemmour-7781334028.
39Rony Brauman, quoted in “Rony Brauman: ‘La kippa est un signe politique d’affiliation à la
politique de l’Etat d’Israël,”’ Le Monde Juif, January 16, 2016, https://www.lemondejuif.info
/2016/01/rony-brauman-la-kippa-est-un-signe-politique-daffiliation-a-la-politique-de-letat
-disrael/.
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kippah not only showed their unflinching support for Israeli policy; they also
violated laïcité in a manner never permitted from Muslims.
If for President Hollande it was intolerable that Jews in France should be
pressured to conceal their religious identities, for both Zemmour and Brau-
man the scandal was the opposite: that Jews felt the inclination to trumpet
these identities so publicly in the first place and that, unlike Muslims, they
were allowed to do so. From a range of vantage points, then, the kippah af-
fair became inextricably linked to the question of the hijab and other Muslim
attire. Some insisted that the kippah was different and must be permitted.
In other renderings, Jewish and Muslim bodies, because of how they sym-
bolically expressed their faith—through what they consumed or what they
wore—were together cast out of the secular republican mainstream once
more.
Later that year, the national debate over the burkini appeared yet again to
assign parallel but also disparate meanings to Jewish and Muslim public reli-
gious attire. In August 2016, traditionally observant Muslim women on sev-
eral public beaches in France were arrested for wearing burkinis: swimwear
that revealed only their faces. Several mayors moved to ban the wearing of
the burkini on their local beaches. Many on the Right claimed that the gar-
ment constituted only the latest provocation by France’s Islamists in their
flagrant rejection of Western values. From the Left, both President Hollande
and Prime Minister Valls of the Socialist government spoke out against the
garment as a threat to public order and values, even as they stopped short
of endorsing a national ban. Eventually, France’s highest court, the Conseil
d’Etat, ruled that the local bans violated the Constitution of the Fifth Repub-
lic, but the debate continued.
The terms in which Valls sought to frame his opposition to the burkini
were highly revealing and familiar. After the decision of the Conseil d’Etat,
he took to Facebook and explained his position in support of the bans: “De-
nouncing the burkini in no way [threatens] the religious freedom of the in-
dividual. There is no freedom that imprisons women. Rather [to denounce
the burkini] is to denounce a mortifying, retrograde Islamism.” In the same
Facebook post, he also called for Muslims to build an “Islam of France.”40
This statement implied that with the right modern adaptations under French
tutelage, Islam could finally become more enlightened and compatible with
40Manuel Valls, “Assumons le débat sur le burkini,” Facebook, August 26, 2016,
https://fr-fr.facebook.com/notes/manuel-valls/assumons-le-d%C3%A9bat-sur-le-burkini
/1125932284153781/. See also “Manuel Valls persiste: ‘Denoncer le burkini, c’est
dénoncer un islamisme mortifère, rétrograde,”’ Franceinfo (website), August 26, 2016,
https://www.francetvinfo.fr/societe/religion/laicite/polemique-sur-le-burkini/arrete-anti
-burkini-invalide-pour-manuel-valls-la-decision-du-conseil-d-etat-n-epuise-pas-le-debat
_1796891.html.
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the duties (including sartorial ones) of citizenship. Valls made this position
more explicit a few days later when he declared: “Marianne, symbol of the
Republic, is bare breasted because she is feeding the people; she is not veiled
because she is free! That is the Republic!”41
Like many others, Valls appeared entirely unaware that the burkini is a
type of swimwear that emerged recently from an effort among many pious
Muslim women to negotiate with the modern world and that has provoked
condemnation from the likes of ISIS.42 The prime minister instead conveyed
a common assumption: women would only cover themselves in restrictive
swimwear if forced to do so by their husbands or a religious authority. No
woman would freely choose this article of clothing that made her less free
and less modern and encumbered her body in the public sphere.43 Thus, even
if at first glance the burkini affair had little immediate relation to Jews, it
ultimately reinscribed the same supercessionist logic as that seen in the con-
troversy over school lunches. Once again, a state official treated as accepted
fact the view that by placing constraints on the body, a religious practice tra-
ditional to Muslims and Jews constitutes an obstacle to the full exercise of
modern French citizenship. Indeed, the burkini resembles the swimwear of
religious Jewish women who go to public beaches in France and elsewhere.
Conclusion
If there was a political bookend to the period that began with the attacks
on Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher, it would seem to have been the presi-
dential elections of 2016–17. Nowhere was this clearer than in the recurrent
centrality of Jews and Muslims—and their frequent inseparability—in politi-
cal rhetoric. In a radio interview on November 23, 2016, former prime minis-
ter and then leading presidential candidate François Fillon caused an uproar
41Manuel Valls, quoted in “Marianne, le voile et les droits des femmes: Les propos
de Valls agacent une historienne,” Big Browser (blog), Le Monde, August 30, 2016,
https://www.lemonde.fr/big-browser/article/2016/08/30/marianne-le-voile-et-les-droits-des
-femmes-les-propos-de-manuel-valls-agacent-une-historienne_4989910_4832693.html.
Valls’s statement was not only a narrow rendering of the meaning of republican citizenship; it
was also a historically inaccurate account of most images of Marianne since the time of the
French Revolution.
42Olivier Roy, interview with Juliette Duclos, “‘Pour les femmes qui le portent, le burkini
est un compromis entre la modernité et la foi,”’ Franceinfo (website), August 21, 2016,
https://www.francetvinfo.fr/societe/religion/laicite/polemique-sur-le-burkini/pour-les-femmes
-qui-le-portent-leburkiniest-un-compromis-entre-la-modernite-et-la-foi_1593515.html.
43Many of these sorts of assumptions are analyzed and problematized in Scott, Politics of the
Veil. For an in-depth study of female agency within the context of traditional Islamic religious
practices and garb, see Saba Mahmoud, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist
Subject (Princeton, NJ, 2005).
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as he responded to a question about Muslim integration in France. He opined:
“We must fight fundamentalism [in the Muslim community], as at other times
in the past we fought a form of Catholic fundamentalism, as we fought the
will of Jews to live in a community that does not respect all the laws of the
French Republic.”44 A little more than one month earlier, another contender
to Fillon’s right—Front National leader Marine Le Pen—explained that as
president she would forbid all “ostentatious religious signs,” including not
only the hijab but also the kippah. Le Pen expressed her confidence that many
French Jews were ready to make this “small sacrifice” for the greater good.45
In February 2017 she reiterated this proposal, and a few days later she added a
new one: all citizens of non-European countries would have to give up either
their non-French or their French citizenship. This proposal clearly targeted
primarily the large number of Muslims who are citizens of both France and a
country in North Africa, but Le Pen affirmed that she would also bar anyone
from maintaining both Israeli and French citizenship.46
At first blush, it might be tempting to see these statements—all of which
elicited fierce critique from the official Jewish community leadership—
simply as classic cases of an appeal to a right-wing, Catholic-inflected ul-
tranationalism, frequently tinged with antisemitism, that retains a foothold
in conservative French politics.47 Yet such an assessment would occlude the
inescapable links between Le Pen’s and Fillon’s formulations and the wider
discourse we have traced here: one of republican, secularist ways of thinking
and speaking about Jews and Muslims that has repeatedly emerged at a series
of flash points since the horrific events of January 2015.48
44François Fillon, quoted in “Le grand rabbin réagit aux propos de Fillon quant à un
communautarisme juif,” Le Monde, November 23, 2016, https://www.lemonde.fr/election
-presidentielle-2017/article/2016/11/23/le-grand-rabbin-reagit-aux-propos-de-fillon-quant-a
-un-communautarisme-juif_5036590_4854003.html.
45Marine Le Pen, quoted in Nissim Behar, “Interdiction de la kippa: Marine Le Pen
hérisse Israël,” Libération, October 28, 2016, http://www.liberation.fr/france/2016/10/18
/interdiction-de-la-kippa-marine-le-pen-herisse-israel_1522826.
46Éric Hazan, “Marine Le Pen persiste: ‘Interdire le port de la kippa pour lutter con-
tre le fondamentalisme,”’ Le Monde Juif.info (website), February 4, 2017, https://www
.lemondejuif.info/2017/02/marine-pen-persiste-interdire-port-de-kippa-lutter-contre
-fondamentalisme/; “Les Franco-Israéliens bannis fulminent contre le projet de Le Pen de
bannir la double nationalité,” JForum.fr (website), February 14, 2017, http://www.jforum.fr
/les-franco-israeliens-bannis-fulminent-contre-le-pen.html.
47Indeed, I have emphasized this aspect elsewhere. See Ethan Katz, “How Marine Le Pen
Relies on Dividing French Jews and Muslims,” Atlantic, April 19, 2017.
48In a related vein, Emile Chabal argues that a neorepublicanism has become as much the
property of Le Pen’s party as that of the Center Right or the Left. See Emile Chabal, “From
the Banlieue to the Burkini: The Many Lives of French Republicanism,” Modern and Con-
temporary France 25, no. 1 (2017): 68–74.
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Such discourses have had a tangible impact on Jewish lives in at least
two ways. The first is the interiorization of signs of Jewishness among a
certain segment of the community. Thus, for instance, security concerns are
not the only reason that more than a few Jews have opted to wear baseball
caps over their kippahs; indeed, many have done so even when indoors or
walking to and from synagogue in their readily identifiable Sabbath attire.49
Second, a number of Jews departing France for Israel have cited increasingly
overbearing public secularism as a key factor, at least as important as secu-
rity concerns or the pull of Zionism. A January 2016 report of the Jewish
Telegraphic Agency quoted individuals who explained their choice to make
aliyah by noting that in France, as visible Jews, they have come to feel like
“outsiders who need to be tolerated.”50
In recent years, many commentators have focused on the prevalence of
Islamophobia in France; substantial attention has been devoted as well to the
problem of antisemitism among a significant portion of the country’s Mus-
lims. But in the tensions that currently beset the triangular relationship be-
tween Jews, Muslims, and the French state and society, there is a third crucial
element, too often overlooked, that this article has sought to highlight: Jews
face an uncertain position vis-a-vis the Republic and laïcité. So long as they
are invoked as at once a special case constitutive of the Republic and a group
that, like Muslims, tests the boundaries of acceptable public religion and cul-
ture, it will be difficult to convince many of France’s Jews that their condition
is not one of crisis.
49Here I follow Zachmann, “The Happy Jew,” 282. In analyzing such choices, it is of course
difficult to disentangle the issue of social pressure from that of security fears, which have also
clearly influenced ideas about Jewish visibility in contemporary France.
50Cnaan Liphshiz, “French Jews Leaving in Record Numbers—But Not for the Reason You
Think,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency (website), January 5, 2016, https://www.jta.org/2016
/01/05/news-opinion/world/french-jews-leaving-in-record-numbers-but-not-for-the-reason
-you-think.
